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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
cases of medical malpractice the legislature provided that a cause of
action accrues from the time the negligence is discovered or should with
reasonable diligence be discovered; however, the action must be brought
within ten years of the date of the negligent act." By extending this
statute to other areas of professional negligence, or by enacting a sepa-
rate statute applicable to professional negligence cases other than medi-
cal cases, the legislature could achieve the purposes of the statute of
limitations and maintain the flexibility of the balancing mechanism.
Diane Kosmach
Torts-Strict Liability-STRIcT LIABILITY NOT APPLICABLE TO USED CAR
DEALERS ABSENT ACTUAL CREATION OF DEFECT-Peterson v. Lou Backrodt
Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E. 2d 785 (1975).
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court in Peterson v. Lou Backrodt
Chevrolet Co.,' refused to extend strict liability to the used car dealer.2
The case arose when the driver of a six-year-old used car hit two pedes-
trians, both minors, killing one and permanently injuring the other.
Plaintiff sued under strict liability in tort, alleging that the automobile
was not reasonably safe when sold by the used car dealer because it
contained a defective braking system. The trial court dismissed the
strict liability count on grounds that a strict liability cause of action
requires an allegation that the defect existed when it left the manufac-
turer's control, not the used car dealer's.3
The appellate court reversed the trial court.' It-took the position that
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (1973).
1. 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
2. Id. at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 786. The complaint alleged that the used car was defective
when sold by the dealer. It did not allege that the used car dealer caused the defect. For
a discussion of this point see note 13 infra.
3. Id. at 19, 329 N.E.2d at 786. This ruling relies upon Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), the leading Illinois strict liability case.
Suvada stated the requisite standard of proof for the strict liability in tort of a manufac-
turer in a defective products case as proof that (1) injury or damage resulted from a
condition of the product, (2) the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and (3)
the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control. 32 Ill.2d at 623, 210
N.E.2d at 188.
4. 17 Ill.App.3d 690,698, 307 N.E.2d 729,735 (2d Dist. 1974).
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the doctrine of strict liability in tort as it has evolved in Illinois requires
that strict liability be applied to used car dealers.5 It reasoned that the
Suvada criteria of imposing strict liability upon the party "creating the
risk and reaping the profit"' applies not only to the party creating the
defect; it also applies to the party that creates the risk of injury through
placement of a defective product into the stream of commerce.7 Since
the used car dealer does, in fact, place products into the stream of
commerce, he should be liable for the risk of injury which these products
create.8
The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing, limited the scope of "crea-
tion of risk" as defined by the appellate court. The "creation of risk"
was restricted to the actual creation of a defect.' Therefore, it refused
to require the used car dealer to assume the burden of defects caused
by other parties.'" The court recognized that strict liability has also been
imposed upon parties in the original distributive chain, even though
they did not actually create the defect." However, it reasoned that
5. Id. at 692-93, 307 N.E.2d at 731.
6. 32 Ill.2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
7. 17 Ill.App.3d at 693, 307 N.E.2d at 731.
8. Id. The appellate court noted that its holding extending strict liability in tort to used
car dealers was premised upon the policy considerations expressed in Suvada. 32 Ill.2d at
619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. The appellate court stated that while a used car dealer does not
"create the risk" in the sense of that phrase's use within Suvada (i.e. the actual creation
of a defect by the manufacturer), a used car dealer does place "motor vehicles into the
stream of commerce in a manner not unlike that of a manufacturer or retailer." 17 Il.
App.3d at 693, 307 N.E.2d at 731.
The appellate court's treatment of the "creation of risk" accomplishes two objectives.
One, the business of selling used cars is brought within the policy objectives of strict
liability as expressed in Suvada by stressing the risk of injury that arises when a business
enterprise places products within the stream of commerce. Two, an allegation tracing the
defect to the manufacturer's control is no longer necessary because the used car dealer's
risk creation is analogous to that of a manufacturer or retailer.
9. 61 Ill.2d at 20-21, 329 N.E.2d at 786-87. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that one
of the policy considerations for a manufacturer's strict liability in tort is the allocation of
loss to those "who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product in
the stream of commerce." Id. at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 786-87. This consideration is distin-
guished by the court from those considerations which justify the imposition of strict
liability upon the wholesaler and retailer. See note 11 infra.
10. Id. at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the used car
dealer is outside the "original producing and marketing chain." Since parties within that
chain are protected by a right of indemnity, the court notes that ultimate liability will be
imposed upon the party creating the risk. However, the court implies that such a right of
indemnity is not readily available to the used car dealer since he is outside this chain and
thus, would assume the burden of loss even though he did not create the risk.
11. Id. at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 787. The court notes that a "wholesaler or retailer who
neither creates nor assumes the risk is entitled to indemnity" and concludes that "al-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
liability upon wholesalers and retailers is justifiable for the following
reasons: parties in the original distributive chain can influence the man-
ufacturer as to the safety of a product, and, unless they assume the risk
of injury, they have a right to indemnification from the manufacturer. 2
Since it was not alleged by the parties in Peterson that the used car
dealer created the defect, he could not be held primarily liable for the
injuries. 3 Therefore, the court implies that imposing liability upon him
could only be justifiable if he had a right to indemnification from the
party that created the defect." Because there were no allegations that
the defect existed when it left the control of the manufacturer, 5 or any
subsequent holder, the used car dealer could not readily look to the
party causing the defect for indemnification of his losses. The court
suggests that it would be unfair to impose upon a used car dealer in
these circumstances the burden of determining who in fact created the
defect, the original manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer or other holders
of the used car. Such a determination creates an impossible burden and
therefore, the used car dealer would "in effect become an insurer against
defects."'"
In refusing to impose strict liability upon used car dealers, the Illinois
Supreme Court ignores essential considerations underlying the imposi-
tion of such liability upon wholesalers and retailers. Strict liability ex-
ists to vindicate the injured plaintiff by shifting the burden of loss to
the party responsible for the product's condition. Wholesalers and re-
though liability is imposed upon anyone who is engaged in the business of selling the
product . . . the loss will ordinarily be ultimately borne by the party that created the
risk." The Illinois Supreme Court ignored the case of Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 111.
App.3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (5th Dist. 1971), appeal denied 49 Ill.2d 575 (1973). In
Galluccio, a bailor-for-hire, who placed leased motor vehicles into the stream of com-
merce, was held actionable upon strict liability in tort for injuries resulting from a defec-
tive condition of the leased vehicle during the specific rental period. Certainly, a bailor-
for-hire is not within the "original producing and marketing chain," a distinguishing
factor which the court in Peterson found to preclude extension of strict liability to used
car dealers.
12. 61 Ill.2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
13. Id. at 21, 329 N.E.2d 787. Since the complaint did not allege that the used car dealer
created the defect, the court did not specifically decide the question of imposing strict
liability upon the used car dealer that created the risk. However, in citing Realmuto v.
Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 344-45, 322 A.2d 440, 444 (1974) (used car dealer action-
able upon strict liability in tort for injury resulting from his defective work, repairs or
replacement of parts upon a used car prior to sale), the court suggests that it is in basic
agreement with its holding.
14. 61 Ill.2d at 20-21, 329 N.E.2d at 787. See notes 9 and 11, supra.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
17. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Wade, Strict
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tailers do not generally create the defect within a product. Yet their
integral role in the distributive process requires their accountability in
strict liability for injuries resulting from a defective condition."i Because
of the realistic capabilities of an ongoing business enterprise, the whole-
saler or retailer is deemed capable of controlling the condition of the
product either directly or indirectly through pressure upon the manufac-
turer."9
The power to control is equally available to the used car dealer. There-
fore, characterizing the dealer as outside the initial distributive process
clouds the issue by neglecting the essential control consideration." Sev-
eral avenues of control are available to the used car dealer. First, he has
the choice of refusing to purchase or otherwise acquire a particular used
car (and offer it for resale) when he believes it is unsafe." Second, his
expertise permits him to detect serious defective conditions through
reasonable inspection.22 Finally, the used car dealer, like the original
retailer or wholesaler, is capable of influencing the manufacturer as to
the motor vehicle's safety. The manufacturer has as intimate and im-
portant a business relation with the used car dealer as with the parties
in the original distributive process. The used car business enlarges the
market for the automobile industry's products. More automobile parts
are manufacturered and sold through the increased reintroduction of
used cars into the stream of commerce. Also, by reintroducing used cars
into commerce, the used car dealer promotes the reliability of a particu-
lar model while providing free advertising to the manufacturer. Clearly,
the used car dealer occupies a bargaining position against the manufac-
turer as strong as the wholesaler's or retailer's.
The Illinois Supreme Court neglects the similarity between parties in
the original distributive chain and the used car dealer, and instead bases
its decision primarily upon the differences in accessibility to indemnifi-
cation from the party actually responsible for the defect. 3 The court
wrongfully assumes that a primary consideration in expanding strict
liability to include distributive parties is that these parties could be
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5,20-21 (1965).
18. 61 Ill.2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 787. See also Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg.
Co., 42 Ill.2d 339,344, 247 N.E.2d 401,404 (1969); Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 IlI.App.2d 6,
13-14, 236 N.E.2d 439,442 (1st Dist. 1968).
19. See Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.2d at 344, 247 N.E.2d at 404;
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256,262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal.Rptr.
896,89d-900 (1964).
20. 61 Ill.2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 786.
21. See 17 Ill.App.3d at 697, 307 N.E.2d at 734.
22. Id.
23. See notes 9-10 supra.
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readily indemnified. 24 The difficulty or facility in obtaining indemnity
has been a negligible consideration in extending strict liability to whole-
salers and retailers. 5 Primary concern is with providing an injured
plaintiff with an available defendant upon whom the initial loss could
be justifiably placed. 6 Since a wholesaler or retailer is in a position to
both profit from the distribution of a product, and control the condition,
he should shoulder some of the responsibility for injuries in the event
the product proves defective. 2 That the ultimate loss would or would
not be borne by the party responsible for the defect did not deter the
imposition of strict liability upon the wholesaler or retailer." Prior court
decisions suggest the interest in permitting the plaintiff a true remedy
for his injuries outweighs the interest of the wholesaler or retailer to
indemnity.29
The used car dealer's role in controlling the condition of the used car,
and profiting from its distribution justifies the imposition of initial loss
upon him.2 0 Through the distribution of these used cars, the dealer
24. 61 Ill.2d at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 787. The court suggests that since the used car dealer
would encounter great difficulty in determining which of the many parties holding the
defective vehicle actually created the defect, he should not be saddled by strict liability.
Id. at 21, 329 N.E.2d at 787.
25. In neither the Dunham case nor the Sweeney case, supra note 18, was the whole-
saler's or retailer's access to indemnity forwarded as a justification for their strict liability
in tort. Notwithstanding that a right to indemnity exists against the party in the distribu-
tive chain who created the risk, see Suvada, 32 Ill.2d at 624, 210 N.E.2d at 189, this
consideration was negligible in extending strict liability to wholesalers and retailers. Aside
from a right of indemnity, the costs of assuring an injured plaintiff maximum protection
can be adjusted through the course of a continuing business relationship between a manu-
facturer and a wholesaler or retailer. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d at 262-
63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal.Rptr. at 900.
26. See Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill.App.2d 315,334, 229 N.E.2d
684, 693 (4th Dist. 1967), aff 'd, 42 Ill.2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal.Rptr. at 899.
27. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 899-900.
28. See note 25 supra.
29. See note 26 supra; Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill.App.2d 6,13-14, 236 N.E.2d 439,442
(1st Dist. 1968).
30. The imposition of strict liability upon a used car dealer would not necessarily
subject him to absolute liability. A limiting factor upon the liability of a used car dealer
is required proof of an "unreasonably dangerous" condition of the used car causing the
injury. In Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (Law
Div. 1975) (used car dealer liable upon strict liability in tort for injury resulting from
safety defect of used tractor unit), the New Jersey Superior Court discusses the useful
purpose which proof of the "unreasonably dangerous" condition may serve to limit the
imposition of an unfair burden upon sellers of used products. 133 N.J. Super. at 286-94,
336 A.2d at 68-73. See also Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 574-77, 484 P.2d
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perpetuates the risk of injury from a defective motor vehicle .3 As to
indemnity, the burden imposed upon parties in the distributive chain
to seek the creator of the defect should likewise be imposed upon the
used car dealer."2 The relative difficulty in obtaining indemnification is
a consideration; however, in view of the used car dealer's position in the
commercial market, it should not outweigh the need for effective reme-
dies to an injured plaintiff.
Mark Spadoro
Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-INJURIEs ARISING
OUT OF PERSONAL DISPUTES MAY BE WORK-RELATED AND THEREFORE
COMPENSABLE-Converters, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 61 I1l.2d 218,
334 N.E.2d 155 (1975).
In order for an employee to qualify for workmen's compensation bene-
fits, his injuries must arise out of and in the course of employment.' By
299, 304-06 (1971) (jury verdict for defendant used car dealer that defect in seven-year-
old used car was not "unreasonably dangerous" upheld as proper under doctrine of strict
liability in tort).
31. A 1973 survey of the used car market indicates that there are more than 100 million
used cars in the United States. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1973, at 57, col. 7. The auto industry
estimates sales of 25 million used cars in 1974, including private trading. N.Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1974, at 31, col. 4. In 1973, sales of new automobiles by domestic and foreign manufac-
turers were approximately 11,433,325. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 43, col. 3. This figure
dropped to 8,856,884 in 1974. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 43, col. 3. In addition, dealers
at United States-Canadian wholesale auctions purchased 1.5 million used cars. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 28, 1974, at 35, col. 6-7. Apparently, used motor vehicles acquired by dealers
account for a conservative 13% of annual sales by domestic and foreign manufacturers.
(This percentage is based on 1973 statistics and does not include trade-ins to dealers.)
32. Such a burden would not be unreasonable. Liability resulting from defects discover-
able upon reasonable inspection or otherwise within the dealer's control, should rest with
the dealer as part of an obligation to provide a reasonably safe car. See 61 Ill.2d 17,22,
329 N.E.2d 785,787 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
Liability for defects beyond the scope of the dealer's control, such as structural or
metallurgical defects traceable to the manufacturer, should ultimately rest with that
party. But, in the interest of protecting the injured plaintiff, the used car dealer should
be liable initially for the loss. This would not prejudice the dealer because through the
process of strict liability indemnity the used car dealer could shift the burden of ultimate
loss to the distributive party responsible for such defect if he chose to do so.
1. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1 et seq. (1975).
The heart of every compensation act, and the source of most litigation in the
compensation field, is the coverage formula. Forty-two states, and the Long-
